Foreign direct investment is in reality a heterogeneous flow of funds, composed of both greenfield-FDI ("greenfield investment") and acquisition-FDI (cross-border mergers and acquisitions). We analyse the choice of FDI mode in an international oligopoly where process R&D decisions are made endogenously and potential entry into the industry is allowed for. Relative to greenfield-FDI, acquisition-FDI is a soft response to the entry threat: in intermediate-sized markets, entry deterrence via greenfield-FDI can make acquisition-FDI unprofitable. The effect of trade liberalisation on acquisition-FDI flows is shown to depend crucially on the R&D technology. Normative analysis shows that equilibria associated with acquisition-FDI generally exhibit higher industry profits but lower consumer surplus than those associated with greenfield-FDI. However, Pareto dominant acquisition-FDI arises in small markets when acquisition prompts R&D investment that would not otherwise occur.
Introduction
In reality, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a heterogeneous°ow of funds, composed of both green¯eld-FDI (\green¯eld investment"), which represents a net addition to the host country's capital stock, and acquisition-FDI (cross-border mergers and acquisitions, M&As), which represents a change in the ownership of pre-existing production facilities in the host country. Estimates of the relative importance of either type of FDI in aggregate global°ows vary considerably, but neither type is ever reported as being trivial: for example, UNC-TAD (2000) reports that 50-80% of total global°ows are acquisition-FDI. 1 Furthermore, as Caves (1996, p. 69) argues, it is intuitively reasonable to expect FDI to have di®erent welfare e®ects depending on its form (at least in the short run): insofar as foreign market entry via acquisition-FDI, rather than green¯eld-FDI, results in a more concentrated market structure, acquisition-FDI will be associated with higher prices and lower consumer welfare than green¯eld-FDI. Indeed, in a survey of empirical research on how the host-country impacts of FDI di®er by mode of entry, UNCTAD (2000) found that the most signi¯cant distinction is that acquisition-FDI is associated, relative to green¯eld-FDI, with a persistent \concentration e®ect."
These observations suggest that the green¯eld/ acquisition distinction is both quantitatively and qualitatively important, and they provoke a number of questions, of which we shall focus on two. First, what determines the form of FDI that arises in equilibrium? Second, what are the comparative welfare properties of equilibria associated with the alternative forms of FDI?
To answer our¯rst (positive) question, we clearly need a model where the choice between green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI is made endogenously. However, the existing formal literature on FDI tends to identify FDI in general with one of its two constituent types. 2 For example, a set of papers examines¯rms' choices between exporting and green¯eld-FDI, where a \tari®-jumping" motive drives green¯eld-FDI. 3 On the other hand, a separate set of papers examines¯rms' choices between exporting and acquisition-FDI, where the industry is an \international oligopoly" spread across two countries. 4 This tendency to focus exclusively on one type of FDI means that existing models of equilibrium FDI cannot explain the green¯eld/ acquisition choice: such an explanation requires a model where the form of FDI is endogenously selected. Providing such a model is the principal contribution of this paper.
In addition to incorporating the choice between green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI, our model also includes¯rms' decisions on two \wider" aspects of corporate strategy: process R&D investment levels are determined endogenously, and potential entry into the industry (at a global level) is allowed for. There is empirical evidence that the total FDI activity of incumbent¯rms in international oligopolies is closely associated with their R&D decisions 1 and with the entry decisions of \outside"¯rms. 5 In order to interpret these empirical correlations, a theoretical understanding of how the variables involved are related at the micro level { i.e., when individual¯rms' strategy spaces are clearly speci¯ed and, therefore, FDI°o ws are disaggregated { is required. In our model, there are initially two incumbent¯rms with \home" plants in di®erent countries. If the incumbents merge (acquisition-FDI), then the resulting multinational enterprise (MNE) next chooses whether to undertake risky process R&D. Finally, before market competition, an \outside"¯rm chooses whether to enter the industry. 6 The \threat point" in the absence of acquisition-FDI is determined as follows:¯rst, the incumbents simultaneously choose whether to undertake green¯eld-FDI and/or process R&D; second, potential entry and market competition occur sequentially. Both the green¯eld-FDI and process R&D decisions are discrete and incur a sunk cost. We solve the game backwards to isolate its subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and acquisition-FDI occurs at the outset if the equilibrium pro¯ts of the integrated¯rm it creates exceed the combined pro¯ts of the two incumbents behaving non-cooperatively (i.e., the standard bilateral merger decision rule of Salant et al., 1983) .
Our positive results on equilibrium determination highlight the conceptual distinctness of green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI, which are shown to arise in equilibrium on distinct parameter sets. In equilibrium, neither the industry volume of green¯eld-FDI nor the occurrence of acquisition-FDI is necessarily monotonically related to national market size. With small national product markets, entry is blockaded, and acquisition-FDI to create an MNE monopolist is pro¯table. As in small markets, in large markets, the potential entrant's optimal decision is independent of whether acquisition-FDI has occurred: entry is always accommodated in equilibrium. However, in intermediate-sized markets, entry is \more likely" following acquisition-FDI: although acquisition-FDI provokes subsequent entry, green¯eld-FDI is used at the threat point (if additional plants are su±ciently cheap) to deter entry. 7 This use of green¯eld-FDI to deter entry reduces the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI in intermediatesized markets but increases that of green¯eld-FDI. Therefore, acquisition-FDI frequently arises in equilibrium for extreme (\small" and \large") but not intermediate market sizes, whereas the industry volume of green¯eld-FDI is nonmonotonically related to market size in the opposite way.
Our positive results demonstrate the importance of analysing both forms of FDI \simul-taneously." In intermediate-sized markets, the option of undertaking green¯eld-FDI, which is exercised in equilibrium, makes otherwise-pro¯table acquisition-FDI unpro¯table in equilibrium by deterring entry and bolstering the incumbents' \disagreement pro¯ts." This point would be missed in a model that omitted green¯eld-FDI strategies and identi¯ed FDI in general with acquisition-FDI in particular. Finally, we examine how changes in the trade cost a®ect FDI°ows in equilibrium. The relationship between the trade cost and the volume of (two-way) green¯eld-FDI is positive, which re°ects the conventional \tari®-jumping" motive. The e®ect of changes in the trade cost on equilibrium acquisition-FDI is more complex.
With very small national markets, entry is blockaded and the equilibrium choice is between two national¯rms at the \threat point" and an MNE monopolist via acquisition-FDI, none of whom invests in process R&D. If the trade cost is su±ciently large, then the national rms can monopoly-price at home in the absence of acquisition-FDI, and industry pro¯ts are una®ected by acquisition-FDI. Therefore, in this case, rises in the trade cost weaken the incentive for acquisition-FDI. 8 However, when in intermediate-sized and large markets the incumbents remain national rms at the \threat point" (because additional plants are too costly for green¯eld-FDI to occur) but invest in process R&D, the e®ect of changes in the trade cost on the incentive for acquisition-FDI depends crucially on the R&D technology. If the probability of R&D success is small, rises in the trade cost encourage acquisition-FDI: it is likely that just one incumbent succeeds in obtaining the process innovation and serves both national markets alone in Bertrand equilibrium. In this outcome, rises in the trade cost reduce the successful innovator's export pro¯ts. However, if R&D success is quite likely, then rises in the trade cost discourage acquisition-FDI: it is likely that both incumbents obtain the process innovation and supply only their home markets in Bertrand equilibrium. In this case, rises in the trade cost o®er the incumbents heightened protection from import competition at home and thereby raise their \disagreement pro¯ts."
Our positive results contrast with and extend those of Bjorvatn (2004) , who also examines the green¯eld/ acquisition choice under oligopoly. 9 However, Bjorvatn's model di®ers in crucial respects from ours. Only¯rm entry-strategies into a single host country are considered. Moreover, neither endogenous R&D investment nor potential entry into the industry at a global level, both of which are associated with incumbent¯rms' FDI decisions in empirical data, is allowed for. Bjorvatn¯nds that (a) the industry volume of green¯eld-FDI is monotonically increasing in market size, 10 and (b) falls in the trade cost increase the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI by intensifying competition and cutting pro¯ts at the \threat point." We show that result (a) is not robust to the inclusion of potential entry and that if¯rms invest in R&D, (b) holds only when the probability of R&D success is large. Finally, when determining the \threat point," Bjorvatn rules out reciprocal green¯eld-FDI by the host-country incumbent in the foreign¯rms' home markets. We show that rms' \disagreement pro¯ts" and, consequently, results on the equilibrium occurrence of acquisition-FDI are sensitive to this omission. 11 To answer our second (normative) motivating question, 12 we compare the equilibrium levels of industry pro¯ts and consumer surplus following acquisition-FDI to those obtained when acquisition-FDI is ruled out (i.e., at the \threat point"). At¯rst blush, it might appear that acquisition-FDI would invariably reduce global welfare by increasing "concentration." However, when potential entry is allowed for, we know that this is not the case (because, relative to green¯eld-FDI, acquisition-FDI is a \soft" response to the entry threat). Moreover, our inclusion of endogenous R&D investment allows us to ask whether, even if it does increase \concentration," acquisition-FDI may improve welfare by raising R&D investment. 13 In the national context, governments have frequently promoted horizontal mergers to create \national champions," whose technological dynamism outweighs (it is argued) the harmful e®ects of merger on consumers. 14 We examine whether acquisition-FDI can increase welfare in an open economy. 15 We¯nd that the welfare comparison of equilibria under acquisition-FDI with their \threat points" generally involves a Williamson (1968) trade-o® between industry pro¯ts and consumer surplus (with acquisition-FDI bene¯tting¯rms collectively relative to the \threat point," but harming consumers). Despite this general result, we do¯nd limited circumstances where acquisition-FDI arises in a Pareto dominant equilibrium, in the sense that both¯rms and consumers are better o® than at the \threat point." In small markets, equilibrium acquisition-FDI can substitute an MNE monopolist that undertakes process R&D for two national¯rms that do not. Because entry is blockaded, acquisition-FDI is pro¯table here. Moreover, if the R&D success probability is su±cently large, then consumers bene¯t despite monopolization. This equilibrium comparison arises when the trade cost is \large" because, in that case, an MNE monopolist has a much larger output base than a national rm and therefore a stronger incentive to invest in R&D. 16 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section de¯nes our modelling structure. Sections 3 and 4 present, respectively, positive analysis of the¯rst motivating question and normative analysis of the second. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Modelling Structure

Sequence of Moves and Equilibrium Concepts
We assume that the world comprises two identical countries and that international shipping of goods incurs a speci¯c trade cost, t. There initially exist four plants to produce the homogeneous product, two in each country. There are three¯rms, two of which (¯rms 1 and 2, the \incumbents") own one plant each in di®erent countries . The third¯rm (¯rm E, the \potential entrant") owns one plant in each country. The incumbents' plants initially have a constant marginal production cost of c, and the potential entrant's plants are initially (drastically) productively ine±cient relative to the incumbents'. 17 By undertaking process R&D, the potential entrant can lower her marginal production cost and become active in product market equilibrium. Therefore, \entry" in our model occurs via R&D investment rather than via sunk investments in new plants. This characterisation of the entry decision is consistent with entry by diversi¯cation: the potential entrant is an incumbent in a \related" industry. 18 Figure 1 illustrates the extensive form of our four-stage game. 19 The stage-one choice between the two subgames is determined by the co-operative green¯eld/ acquisition decision rule (GADR), which is formally equivalent to the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) decision rule: one of the incumbents acquires the other if and only if the integrated¯rm's equilibrium pro¯ts in the A subgame are strictly greater than the sum of the incumbents' equilibrium pro¯ts in the G subgame. In stages two and three, the incumbents and the potential entrant, respectively, make their sunk investments. In stage four market equilibrium is established in both countries via Bertrand competition. Firms maximize their expected pro¯ts, and equilibrium industrial structures are derived as follows. The A and G subgames are solved backwards to isolate their subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The GADR then determines which subgame is played. Therefore, the G-equilibrium represents a threat point if take-over negotiations break down.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] Firms can establish additional plants (each with a constant marginal production cost) in either country at a sunk cost of G. Therefore, there are plant-level economies of scale, and neither the potential entrant nor the acquirer will optimally establish additional plants. 20 Moreover, each incumbent will optimally establish at most one additional plant abroad in the G subgame.
Technology is a public good within the¯rm. Technological progress occurs via process R&D investments in steps, and each step incurs a sunk cost of I. The technological laggard (the potential entrant) can purchase the industry's best-practice technology (i.e. a marginal production cost of c) in one step. For¯rms on the technological frontier (i.e. the incumbents initially, and the potential entrant after sinking an investment of I to catch up), I purchases a process R&D investment with a risky outcome. With probability p, R&D investment \succeeds" and the¯rm's marginal production cost falls to 0; however, with probability 1 ¡ p, R&D investment \fails" and the¯rm's marginal production cost remains at c. The probability of success p is identical and independent across¯rms. Several aspects of the order of moves in Figure 1 require justi¯cation. First, Bertrand competition is modelled as the¯nal stage after¯rms have taken production location and R&D investment decisions because decisions involving sunk investments entail more commitment than pricing decisions, which can be altered rapidly and at relatively little cost. It is thus natural (and conventional) to treat pricing policies as contingent on prior sunk investment decisions. Second, we assume that the incumbents (whether or not an acquisition occurs) make sunk investments before the potential entrant to capture the frequently-cited rst-mover advantage of incumbency (e.g. Dixit, 1980) : historical presence in the industry 18 Gilbert and Newbery (1982) also assume that entry occurs via R&D investment. The assumption of entry by a diversifying MNE can be justi¯ed on two empirical grounds. First, Geroski (1995, p. 424) shows that de novo entry is \less successful than entry by diversi¯cation." Second, Davies et al. (2001) in their study of 277 leading European manufacturers reported that 104 (i.e. 37.5%) were both multinational and diversi¯ed, indicating that the two strategies are often complements. We do not allow the potential entrant to enter via acquisition. We implicity assume that the sunk costs of administering such a merger are prohibitive (e.g. due to the problems of fusing together di®erent corporate cultures when the¯rms involved historically operated in di®erent industries).
19 Figure 1 incorporates the simpli¯cation of¯rms' strategic choices given in Lemma 1. 20 Note that, via acquisition-FDI, the acquirer gains the rival incumbent's \home" plant.
a®ords the incumbents earlier knowledge of, and ability to exploit, pro¯table investment opportunities created by the opening up of national markets to cross-border trade and investment°ows. Third, the incumbents' merger decision (leading potentially to a°ow of acquisition-FDI) occurs before their process R&D and green¯eld-FDI decisions. We make this assumption to add signi¯cant interest to our investigation of the second motivating question given in the Introduction (\What are the comparative welfare properties of equilibria associated with the alternative forms of FDI?"). By making R&D investments conditional on whether a merger has occurred, we are able to explore additional welfare consequences of merger to the \pricing e®ects" that have traditionally dominated the literature. 21 Given the characteristics of the¯rms' strategic choices described above, the strategy spaces of the acquirer (in the A subgame) and the potential entrant are fN; Rg and f?; E; Rg respectively. N and ? both represent decisions to invest nothing in process R&D. A choice of E by the potential entrant costs I and reduces its marginal production cost to c. A choice of R produces a marginal production cost of either 0 (\success") or c (\failure"), and it costs the acquirer I but the potential entrant 2I. An incumbent's stage-two strategy space (in the G subgame) is f1N; 1R; 2N; 2Rg. The¯rst component of each pair indicates how many plants the incumbent will maintain (a choice of 2 costs G); the second component indicates whether (R) or not (N) the incumbent invests in process R&D at a sunk cost of I.
Lemma 1 allows us to drop the strategies of E and 2N from the strategy spaces.
Lemma 1: (i) The potential entrant will never optimally choose a corporate structure of E because it is strictly dominated by one of ?.
(ii) In the G subgame, an incumbent will never optimally choose a corporate structure of 2N because it is strictly dominated by one of 1N.
Proof: Both results follow directly from the assumption of Bertrand competition in homogeneous goods. Choosing E over ? and 2N over 1N leaves expected variable pro¯ts unchanged (because the¯rm does not gain a marginal cost advantage) but increases sunk costs. 22
Throughout we maintain the following assumption, which seems intuitively reasonable, on t and c:
Market Size and Variable Pro¯ts
Market demand in either country is
Q k and x k are demand and price in country k respectively, k 2 f1; 2g. ¹ measures the \size" of either national product market and can be interpreted as an index of the number of homogeneous consumers in each country, all of whom have a reservation price of 1.
Variable pro¯ts equal revenue minus variable costs. If either national product market is monopolized by¯rm i with a constant marginal cost of c i , the monopoly price will be
The monopolist's variable pro¯ts are ¹R M (c i ), where
measures variable pro¯t per consumer. If¯rms i and j serve either national product market in a Bertrand duopoly, then¯rm i's variable pro¯t function is ¹R (c i ; c j ), where
again measures variable pro¯t per consumer. These results are standard. Variable pro¯ts at a Bertand equilibrium with more than two¯rms can be straightforwardly derived if c j is de¯ned as the minimum of¯rm i's rivals' marginal costs (i.e. c j´m in fc 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c i¡1 ; c i+1 ; :::; c N g).
3 Positive Analysis 3.1 Equilibria in the A subgame Table 1 gives the payo® matrix in the A subgame. Because both the acquirer and the potential entrant own 2 plants, the trade cost t is irrelevant in the A subgame: international trade°ows never occur in equilibrium. If the potential entrant chooses ?, then the acquirer monopolises both product markets. If the potential entrant chooses R, then either¯rm must possess a marginal production cost advantage over its rival to earn R(0; c) in both countries, which occurs with probability p(1 ¡ p) when both¯rms undertake R&D.
[
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The equilibria of the A subgame are plotted in (p; ¹)-space in Figure 2 . We consider the potential entrant's optimal decision¯rst, which may be conditional on the acquirer's prior choice. If the acquirer chooses N, then the potential entrant has R Â ? i®
If the acquirer chooses R, then the potential entrant has R Â ? i®
For p 2 (0; 1] ¹ > ¹, so there are three distinct situations to be faced by the acquirer when making her stage-two R&D decision (see Figure 1 ). For ¹ < ¹ entry is blockaded (i.e. E's dominant strategy is ?), and the acquirer has R Â N i®
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For ¹ 2 ¡ ¹; ¹ ¢ the potential entrant's optimal decision is conditional on the acquirer's choice (i.e. E optimally chooses R in response to N, but the acquirer can deter entry by choosing R), and the acquirer has R Â N i®
Finally, for ¹ > ¹ the acquirer must accommodate entry (i.e. E's dominant strategy is R), and the acquirer has R Â N i®
The acquirer's incentive to undertake R&D is stronger when it actively deters entry than when entry is anyway blockaded (since entry reduces the acquirer's expected pro¯ts); and because ¹ > ¹ (1A) (i.e. A optimally chooses R in the upper part of the blockaded-entry region 23 ), this means that the acquirer always chooses R when it actively deters entry. When entry must be accommodated (i.e. ¹ > ¹´¹ (2A)), the acquirer always undertakes R&D. Figure 2 shows that the acquirer is \more likely" to undertake R&D, the larger is p or ¹. Note that although the entry threat in the A subgame alters the acquirer's \incentives" to invest in R&D, it does not alter the acquirer's equilibrium behaviour relative to the benchmark of blockaded entry, where (1A) would also determine the acquirer's R&D decision. The potential entrant is \more likely" to choose R, the larger is ¹; but the likelihood of entry is maximized at the intermediate p-value p = 0:5. This is because entry only pays o® (ex post) for¯rm E if it wins an R&D advantage over A (due to the assumption of Bertrand competition), the probability of which is p (1 ¡ p).
Equilibria in the G subgame
The G subgame originates in Ferrett (2004) where it was called the \potential-entry game." The formal properties of the G subgame are summarised in section 6.1 of the Appendix; here, we give an intuitive account of the subgame's comparative statics. Under the following two assumptions on the marginal and sunk cost parameters, Figure 3 plots the G-equilibria in (p; ¹)-space:
Assumption (B) on t and c is only slightly more restrictive than our maintained assumption (A). (See Figure 6 in the Appendix where (B) holds in regions III and IV: in general, (B) holds if the gap c ¡ t is su±ciently large.) It is straightforward but tedious to show that the LHS of (C) is strictly greater than 1 for all (c; t) under assumption (A). (Therefore, setting G¸I certainly satis¯es (C); however, it is unnecessary. 24 )
The G-equilibria in Figure 3 are reported in the form (S 1 ; S 2 ; S E ), where S 1 and S 2 are the incumbents' corporate structure choices and S E is the potential entrant's. In regions I, II and III the G-equilibria depend on whether the incumbents deter or accommodate entry
24 For example, if c À t > 0:5, then R (0; t) = R (0; c) = R M (0) and R (t; c) is \large." Therefore, the LHS of (C) is much greater than 1, and some I > G will be compatible with (C).
in equilibrium. Entry deterrence occurs via green¯eld-FDI, and it is therefore \more likely," the smaller is G. To gain a feel for the comparative statics of the G subgame, consider the e®ect of changes in market size on the incumbents' green¯eld-FDI spending. In small markets (i.e. ¹ < ¹ (6G)) green¯eld-FDI does not (in general) arise because the sunk cost G cannot be supported. 25 In large markets (i.e. ¹ > ¹ (9G)) the incumbents must accommodate entry, and (two-way) green¯eld-FDI occurs only if national product markets are \very large" (i.e. ¹ > ¹ (10G)). In intermediate-sized markets (i.e. ¹ (9G) > ¹ > ¹ (6G)), green¯eld-FDI behaviour is more complex because entry can be deterred via green¯eld-FDI, which occurs when G is \small." Therefore, if G is \large," the incumbents accommodate entry in intermediate-sized markets (by remaining \national"¯rms), and the volume of green¯eld-FDI increases monotonically over the whole domain of ¹. However, if G is \small," one or both of the incumbents undertakes green¯eld-FDI to deter entry in intermediate-sized markets, and the volume of green¯eld-FDI decreases as markets move from \intermediate-sized" to \large" (i.e. as ¹ crosses ¹ (9G)). This occurs because an incumbent's green¯eld-FDI incentive is stronger just below ¹ (9G), where green¯eld-FDI can be used to deter entry that would otherwise occur, than just above, where entry must be accommodated.
Equilibrium industrial structures: A-equilibrium vs. G-equilibrium
In this section we compare the A-and G-equilibria for given parameter values to derive overall equilibrium industrial structures and the equilibrium mode of FDI. This task comprises two steps. (The mechanics are presented in section 6.2 of the Appendix.) First, we locate the inter-regional boundaries in the A subgame (Figure 2 ) relative to those in the G subgame (Figure 3 ), so that both the A-and G-equilibria are¯xed for given parameter values. Second, we determine the equilibrium industrial structure by comparing the acquirer's pro¯ts at the A-equilibrium to the incumbents' at the G-equilibrium. 26 Figures 4A and 4B plot the resulting equilibrium industrial structures for \small" and \large" t respectively. 27 For easy reference and comparison of the \small" and \large" t cases, Table 2 We need to de¯ne the distinction between \small" and \large" t, which underpins Figures 4A and 4B, formally. We say that t is \large" if and only if
In Figure 6 in the Appendix, (D) holds in region III (\large" t) but fails in region IV (\small" t). If (D) holds (\large" t, Figure 4B ), then ¹ (1A) lies always below ¹ (1G), whereas the opposite is true if (D) fails (\small" t, Figure 4A ). Condition (D) has a straightforward economic meaning (in terms of¯rms' \incentives" to undertake R&D), which is explained in the next section where it naturally arises in the context of normative analysis.
We summarize our positive results on equilibrium determination in Proposition 1.
25 For the sake of clarity, this abstracts from the (1N; 2R; ?) equilibrium.
26 Where multiple G-equilibria exist, acquisition-FDI arises in equilibrium if the unique A-equilibrium dominates either all its \threat points" (as inside ¹ (3G), ¹ (4G) and ¹ (5G) in Fig. 3 ) or the incumbents' Pareto dominant \threat point" (as in region III of Fig. 3 with \small" G). 1. Acquisition-FDI: (a) Acquisition-FDI is generally strictly pro¯table in small markets (¹ < ¹ (2A)) where entry into the industry is blockaded. (b) In small and large (¹ > ¹ (9G)) markets, the potential entrant's optimal decision is independent of whether acquisition-FDI occurs. However, in intermediate-sized markets (¹ (2A) < ¹ < ¹ (9G)), the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI is reduced when it provokes sebsequent entry that is deterred at the G-equilibrium (especially via green¯eld-FDI).
2. Green¯eld-FDI: (a) Two conditions are necessary for green¯eld-FDI to arise in equilibrium: su±ciently large markets (¹), and a su±ciently small plant cost (G). Consider¯rst equilibrium selection in small markets (¹ < ¹ (2A)) where entry into the industry is blockaded. Here, acquisition-FDI results in monopolization and is therefore strictly pro¯table in general (part 1a). The exception to this result concerns the (N; ?) vs. (1N; 1N; ?) comparison in very small markets (part 4a): large t a®ords the incumbents su±cient protection to monopoly-price in the G-equilibrium, implying no strict pro¯tability gains from acquisition-FDI; but if t is small, acquisition-FDI increases industry pro¯ts by eliminating the import competition faced by the incumbents in the G-equilibrium.
In intermediate-sized markets (¹ (9G) > ¹ > ¹ (2A)), the potential entrant's optimal decision depends on whether acquisition-FDI occurs: the A-equilibrium is (R; R), but entry can be deterred in the G subgame { generally, but not always, by green¯eld-FDI (part 1b). 29 Our de¯nition of \intermediate-sized" markets captures the fact that entry is \more likely" to occur in the A subgame than in the G subgame, which makes intuitive sense because the potential entrant faces a monopoly in the A subgame but a duopoly in the G subgame. 30 If the plant sunk cost is small, then one-or two-way green¯eld-FDI°ows frequently arise in equilibrium in intermediate-sized markets (part 2a) for two reasons:¯rst, a small plant cost implies that entry-deterring G-equilibria involving green¯eld-FDI exist (see section 3.2); and second, this deterrence of entry bolsters the incumbents' \disagreement pro¯ts" and renders acquisition-FDI, which would provoke entry, unpro¯table (part 3). When the plant sunk cost is large, entry is accommodated in G-equilibrium in intermediate-sized markets and, consequently, the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI improves: therefore, the incumbents frequently substitute acquisition-for green¯eld-FDI when plants become more costly (part 2c). 31 Large markets (¹ > ¹ (9G)) are such that entry always occurs in both subgames. If markets are very large (¹ > ¹ (10G)), then a choice between green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI arises. Acquisition-FDI allows the incumbents to economise on sunk costs; therefore, large plant and R&D costs both favour acquisition-FDI. 32 The pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI also increases with p. 33 Viewing our positive results as a whole prompts three observations. First, neither the industry volume of green¯eld-FDI nor the occurrence of acquisition-FDI is necessarily monotonically related to market size in equilibrium. The possibility of entry deterrence in the G subgame means that an incumbent's green¯eld-FDI incentive is stronger just below ¹ (9G), where green¯eld-FDI can be used to deter entry that would otherwise occur, than just above, where entry must be accommodated. Therefore, for a small plant sunk cost, the industry volume of green¯eld-FDI falls as markets move from \intermediate-sized" to \large," before (possibly) rising again when markets become very large (¹ > ¹ (10G)). The same basic reasoning means that the occurrence of acquisition-FDI can be nonmonotonic in market size in precisely the opposite fashion. Acquisition-FDI invariably arises in \small" markets and often in \large" markets. However, entry deterrence via green¯eld-FDI in \intermediate-sized" markets, where the acquirer must accommodate entry, makes acquisition-FDI unpro¯table.
Secondly, and related to the previous point, our positive¯ndings illustrate the importance of analysing both forms of FDI \simultaneously" (part 3 of Proposition 1): for example, in \intermediate-sized" markets, the option of undertaking green¯eld-FDI, when exercised in equilibrium, makes otherwise-pro¯table acquisition-FDI unpro¯table. This point would be missed in a model that identi¯ed FDI in general with acquisition-FDI in particular (and excluded green¯eld-FDI strategies).
Third, our results highlight the complex e®ects of changes in the trade cost on equilibrium FDI°ows. Two-way green¯eld-FDI becomes \more likely" in equilibrium if the trade cost rises (part 4c of Proposition 1): a higher t makes two-way green¯eld-FDI \more likely" in G-equilibrium, 34 and the pro¯tability comparison between (R; R) and either (2R; 2R; ?) or (2R; 2R; R) is independent of t (because international trade occurs in none of the equilibria considered). The e®ect of changing t on equilibrium acquisition-FDI depends, of course, on which \threat point" is considered. The (R; R) vs. (1R; 1R; R) comparison depends on t and p in an economically interesting way (part 4b of Proposition 1). 35 The acquirer's pro¯ts in (R; R) are independent of t, and the derivative of the incumbents' expected pro¯ts in (1R; 1R; R) with respect to t is 2p
However, acquisition-FDI is not always substituted for green¯eld-FDI when the plant cost rises because the \threat point" itself depends on the plant cost: e.g., for small p and ¹ 2 (¹ (6G) ; ¹ (8G)) in Fig. 4A , (1R; 1R; R) is the unique \threat point" and overall equilibrium for large G.
32 By assumption, the integrated¯rm formed by acquisition-FDI runs only one research lab.
33 This is a mathematical artefact. The incumbents earn strictly positive variable pro¯ts with probability
34 In Fig. 3 , ¹ (7G) and ¹ (10G) are both decreasing in t, and ¹ (9G) is independent of t.
35 If green¯eld-FDI were ruled out, (1R; 1R; R) would be the \threat point" for all ¹ > ¹ (6G).
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the derivative approximately equals 2p (1 ¡ p) 2 ¹ dR (t; c) dt < 0, so increases in t increase the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI: 36 with small p, it is more likely that just one of the incumbent's R&D e®orts in (1R; 1R; R) succeeds than that they both succeed (i.e. 2p (1 ¡ p) > p 2 ). In this \more likely" outcome, the sole successful innovator serves both countries' markets, earning R (0; c) per head at home and R (t; c) abroad, and increases in t cut its export pro¯ts.
By contrast, for large p, the derivative approximately equals 2p 2 (1 ¡ p) ¹ dR (0; t) dt¸0 , so increases in t reduce the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI: 37 the \more likely" con¯guration of incumbents' R&D outcomes in (1R; 1R; R) is that both incumbents' R&D e®orts succeed, which implies that both incumbents earn R (0; t) per head at home and that increases in the trade cost increase pro¯ts by o®ering heightened protection against import competition.
Normative Analysis
In this section we perform some illustrative welfare comparisons between the A-and Gequilibria. Our welfare concept is global social welfare, which is composed of total expected consumer surplus across both countries and total expected pro¯ts across the three¯rms. 38 To keep the analysis tractable and brief, we concentrate on four distinct pairs of A-and G-equilibria that arise in Figures 4A and 4B (each is coded with a \C" for \comparison"):
C1. (1N; 1N; ?) vs. (N; ?), which arises on ¹ < min f¹ (1A) ; ¹ (1G)g.
C2. (1R; 1R; ?) vs. (R; ?), which arises on
¹ (2A) > ¹ > max f¹ (1A) ; ¹ (2G)g.
C3. (2R; 2R; R) vs. (R; R), which arises on ¹ > ¹ (10G).
C4. (1N; 1N; ?) vs. (R; ?), which arises on ¹ (1G) > ¹ > ¹ (1A) (a non-empty interval i® (D) holds).
We summarize the results of our welfare comparisons in C1-C4 in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2:
1. Williamson Trade-o®: When industry R&D spending is no larger at the A-equilibrium, the welfare comparison of A-and G-equilibria generally involves a Williamson (1968)-type trade-o® between industry pro¯ts and consumer surplus.
Pareto Dominance:
When industry R&D spending is strictly larger at the A-equilibrium, equilibrium acquisition-FDI is Pareto dominant in small markets for su±ciently large p if and only if c + t > 0:5.
36 This e®ect is observed in equilibrium outcomes in Figs 4A and 4B on ¹ 2 (¹ (8G) ; ¹ (9G)). This result di®ers from those of Horn and Persson (2001) and Tekin-Koru (2004) , which both¯nd that increases in trade costs cut the pro¯tability of cross-border mergers (by o®ering¯rms heightened protection at home at the threat point, as in part 4a of Proposition 1). Hijzen et al. (2005) provide some evidence that \tari®-jumping" motivates horizontal cross-border mergers.
37 This e®ect is observed in equilibrium outcomes in Figs 4A and 4B on ¹ 2 (¹ (9G) ; ¹ (10G)) when I is small. This result is consistent with trade liberalisation contributing towards the boom in high-tech cross-border M&As in the late 1990s.
38 All of our cost variables are assumed to represent opportunity costs. In particular, there are no tari®s in t. Given national demand Q k = ¹ (1 ¡ x k ), aggregate consumer surplus in country k at market price
2 , a slight abuse of notation because S is used elsewhere for¯rms' \corporate structure" choices. We are implicitly assuming that the income e®ects of price changes are negligible, e.g. that the good represents a small share of the \representative" consumer's spending.
Part 1 refers to pairs C1-C3. The \Williamson trade-o®" means that expected industry pro¯ts are higher, but consumer surplus lower, at the A-equilibrium than at the Gequilibrium. In all of C1-C4, the occurrence of acquisition-FDI in equilibrium is su±cient for industry pro¯ts to be higher at the A-equilibrium than at the G-equilibrium. 39 Moreover, acquisition-FDI arises in equilibrium for all permissible parameter values in C1, C2 and C4, 40 and it arises in equilibrium in C3 if p is \large" (¸0:5). Therefore, acquisition-FDI generally increases expected industry pro¯ts in C1-C3.
On the other hand, consumer surplus is certainly lower under acquisition-FDI in C1-C3. 41 In these three cases, acquisition-FDI is associated with a more \concentrated" industrial structure and unchanged or reduced industry R&D spending. Where, as in C1-C3, a Williamson trade-o® exists, the normative conclusion depends crucially on the weights assigned to consumer surplus and pro¯ts in the global social welfare function: the greater is the relative weight on consumer surplus, the \more likely" it becomes that acquisition-FDI is considered undesirable (relative to its \threat point"). 42 However, there are circumstances in our model when the A-equilibrium Pareto dominates the G-equilibrium so no Williamson trade-o® exists (part 2 of Proposition 2): both industry pro¯ts and consumer surplus are higher following acquisition-FDI. In C4, equilibrium acquisition-FDI raises industry pro¯ts, and for su±ciently large p expected consumer surplus is higher under (R; ?) than (1N; 1N; ?) if and only if c + t > 0:5. 43 Therefore, subject to some parameter restrictions, the A-equilibrium can Pareto dominate the G-equilibrium if industry R&D spending is larger following acquisition-FDI than it would be otherwise. This gives some (quali¯ed) support to the hypothesis that acquisition-FDI can foster \technolog-ical progress," the bene¯ts of which outweigh the costs of monopolization.
39 In C1, C2 and C4, where entry occurs in neither equilibrium considered, equilibrium acquisition-FDI is also necessary for higher industry pro¯ts. In C3, note that ¼E (R; R) > ¼E (2R; 2R; R), so a su±cient (but unnecessary) condition for expected industry pro¯ts to be higher in (R; R) is that the incumbents prefer (R; R). This certainly occurs for \large" (¸0:5) p. (2000) for an analysis of the consumer surplus e®ects of the green¯eld-FDI/ exporting choice when R&D is endogenous.)
42 Economic theorists typically weight consumer surplus and pro¯ts equally. However, Lyons (2002) argues that, in reality, competition authorities place a substantial premium on consumer surplus in evaluating proposed mergers. Note also that our model can display a \reverse" Williamson trade-o®: just above ¹ (2A) in Figures 4A and 4B , where E's expected pro¯ts in (R; R) are very small,¯rms collectively prefer the G-equilibrium but consumers prefer the A-equilibrium. The¯nding that, for certain parameter values, R&D can occur in A-but not in Gequilibrium is perhaps counter-intuitive because the G subgame is more \competitive." 44 The key to the puzzle lies in comparing the \incentives" to undertake R&D of the acquirer and an (independent) incumbent in the G subgame. Given that entry is blockaded, the acquirer's expected variable pro¯ts rise by 2p¹
chooses R over N; with R&D success, it earns R M (0) per head rather than R M (c) in both countries. Also with blockaded entry, an incument's expected variable pro¯ts in the G subgame rise by p¹ [R (0; c + t) + R (t; c) ¡ R (c; c + t)] if it chooses 1R over 1N in response to 1N by its rival; with R&D success, it earns R (0; c + t) per head at home rather than R (c; c + t), and it makes export pro¯ts of R (t; c). Therefore, the economic interpretation of condition (D) holding, which is required for comparison C4 to arise, is that (for p; ¹ > 0) the acquirer has a stronger incentive to invest in R&D than an incumbent at the \threat point."
Condition (D) holds (see Figure 6 in the Appendix) for su±ciently large t. 45 To see the intuition for this, consider the case where t is very large (\prohibitive"): if the incumbents remain national¯rms in the G subgame, then the return to either from R&D investment is an increase in expected monopoly pro¯ts on one (\home") market. Therefore, an independent incumbent's expected return to R&D investment is exactly half that enjoyed by the acquirer. 46 This limiting example highlights clearly the source of the acquirer's stronger R&D \incentive" in C4: its larger output base, over which a process innovation can be spread, due to the elimination (\jumping") of trade costs following acquisition-FDI. The cause of Pareto dominant acquisition-FDI in our model (an \output base" e®ect) di®ers from that in Horn and Persson (2001) , where mergers are associated with savings in¯xed and variable production costs (\synergies") whose size is exogenously¯xed. If, as in C4, acquisition-FDI is Pareto dominant, then the normative conclusion is independent of the relative weights assigned to consumer surplus and pro¯ts, which generates added interest in the analysis of cases of Pareto dominance. 47
Conclusion
By building a model where the form of FDI (green¯eld-FDI vs. acquisition-FDI) is endogenously selected, a key aim of this paper was to explain the green¯eld/ acquisition choice. Our motivation was twofold. First, the green¯eld/ acquisition distinction is quantitatively important in empirical data (on both°ow values and project numbers): neither type of FDI is ever reported as being trivial. Second, intuition suggests that the distinction is also qualitatively important: at least in the short run, it is reasonable to expect acquisition-FDI to result in a more \concentrated" market structure than green¯eld-FDI, which implies that the welfare e®ects of the two forms of entry may di®er markedly. Despite these observations, the existing formal literature on FDI tends to identify FDI in general with just one of its two constituent types.
Because our modelling structure allowed two \wider" aspects of industrial structure also to be endogenously determined (i.e.¯rms' investment levels in process R&D and the number of¯rms), it can be used to investigate the interactions between the green¯eld/ acquisition choice and those other industry characteristics. Two such interactions stand out in our positive analysis. First, we found that, relative to green¯eld-FDI, acquisition-FDI is a \soft" response by the incumbents to the entry threat: in intermediate-sized markets, acquisition-FDI provokes, but green¯eld-FDI deters, entry. The entry-deterrence potential of green¯eld-FDI reduces the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI in intermediate-sized markets, and it implies that neither the industry volume of green¯eld-FDI nor the occurrence of acquisition-FDI need necessarily be monotonically related to national market size. Second, we showed that if both incumbents invest in process R&D, the e®ect of changes in the trade cost on the incentive for acquisition-FDI depends crucially on the R&D technology: if the probability of R&D success is small (large), then trade liberalisation (i.e., falls in the trade cost) discourages (encourages) acquisition-FDI.
In our normative analysis, the inclusion of endogenous R&D decisions allowed us to examine whether acquisition-FDI can sometimes be justi¯ed (despite the welfare costs associated with increased \concentration") because it leads to increased industry R&D spending. We found that equilibria involving acquisition-FDI are generally associated, relative to their \threat points," with a Williamson (1968)-type welfare trade-o® between industry pro¯ts and consumer surplus. However, in small markets, when equilibrium acquisition-FDI is associated with R&D spending that would not otherwise occur, it can also raise consumer surplus despite monopolization. In this case, acquisition-FDI raises industry R&D spending because the MNE monopolist it forms has a much larger output base than a national¯rm and therefore a stronger incentive to invest in process R&D.
A general conclusion of this paper is that green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI are conceptually quite distinct (in terms of both the positive and the normative aspects of the industrial structures that they are associated with), which casts doubt on the legitimacy of many analyses that treat FDI as a homogeneous°ow of funds. However, further work is needed to test the robustness both of this general conclusion and of our more speci¯c results. Our modelling structure is relatively stylised, and future work will attempt to relax some of our assumptions.
6 Appendix [Not for Publication]
The G Subgame
48
Under assumption (A) on the marginal cost parameters, Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the¯rms' expected variable pro¯ts per consumer at Bertrand equilibrium when one incumbent (¯rm 1) chooses 1N, 1R and 2R respectively. Expected pro¯ts can be derived by multiplying by ¹ and subtracting the relevant sunk costs: 0 for 1N and ?, I for 1R, 2I for R, and G + I for 2R. All the expected variable pro¯t functions have the same general form: each is a weighted sum of the¯rm's global variable pro¯ts across all possible \states of the world," where each state is associated with a distinct con¯guration of R&D outcomes across¯rms and the weight applied is the probability of that state's occurrence. 49 [INSERT TABLES 3, 4 AND 5 HERE] Denoting¯rm 1's expected variable pro¯ts per consumer by ¼ 1 (S 1 ; S 2 ; S E ) (where S f is rm f 's \corporate structure"), the inter-regional boundaries in Figure 3 are such that 50
Assumption (C) on G and I, presented in the main text, is necessary for Figure 3 but not su±cient. 51 However, all G, I in (C) generate a plot of G-equilibria that, for our purposes, is only trivially di®erent from Figure 3 . Region I has two G-equilibria (as in the key to Figure  3 ), rather than a unique equilibrium of (1R; 1R; ?), i®
which is tighter than (C) (i.e. LHS(C) > LHS(C)*). However, the distinction is trivial because, as we show below (section 6.2), the counterpart A-equilibrium of (R; ?) is always selected in region I. By extension, we do not judge it important that
(C)** whose RHS is strictly less than the LHS of (C)*. (If I=G is very small, so that (C)* holds but (C)** fails, then region I will extend to p = 1 but will continue to lie entirely above ¹ (2G).) Finally, it should be noted that (C)** is also necessary and su±cient for
The G-equilibria in regions II and III of Figure 3 depend on whether G is \small" or \large" (within (C)). Furthermore (see section 6.2), within both regions II and III, the stageone choice between the G subgame and the counterpart A-equilibrium of (R; R) is sensitive to whether the G-equilibrium deters (\small" G) or accommodates (\large" G) entry. Therefore, we need to make explicit the notion of \small" vs. \large" G: \small" G will mean G · I, and \large" G refers to the limiting case as G ¡! 1. The following results from Proposition 4 of Ferrett (2004) then apply:
50 The following equality conditions are \indi®erence conditions" for the¯rm whose variable pro¯t function is featured. The symmetry of our model across incumbents implies that \1" could be replaced by \2" (with incumbent 2's expected variable pro¯ts written as ¼2 (S2; S1; SE)) and that the incumbents' choices in ¼E (¢) could be swapped. In the de¯nitions of ¹ (7G) and ¹ (10G), S2 = 1R could be replaced by S2 = 2R without change of meaning because product markets are \national," so an incumbent's green¯eld-FDI decision depends on \competitive conditions" abroad, which are independent of the rival incumbent's green¯eld-FDI decision. (ii) If G = I and p is su±ciently large (¹ > ¹ (7G) is su±cient but unnecessary), then a second G-equilibrium of (2R; 2R; ?) exists in region III of Figure 3 .
(iii) In both regions II and III of Figure 3 : Falls in G make the existence of entry-deterring G-equilibria \more likely" (so (i) and (ii) generalize to all \small" G { with looser restrictions on on t and p respectively), and in the limit as G ¡! 1 (i.e. \large" G) entry-deterring G-equilibria never exist. 52
6.2 Equilibrium Industrial Structures: A-equilibrium vs. G-equilibrium
Comparing inter-regional boundaries from Figures 2 and 3
We need to locate the inter-regional boundaries from Figures 2 and 3 relative to each other in order to¯x, for given parameter values, the counterpart A-and G-equilibria. The result is given in Figure 5 .
[ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] We have ¹ (6G)¸¹ ( Turning to
which holds for su±ciently large t (in Figure 6 (D) holds in region III but fails in region IV). If (D) fails (so ¹ (1A) > ¹ (1G) for all p), then we know that
which is looser than (C) and therefore holds (2
, which holds for all c, is su±cient for this because R(0; c)¸R(0; t)). Finally, ¹ (1A) > ¹ (2G) for p > 0 i®
where LHS > 0 because (D) fails and [¢] on RHS > 0 by (B). For \small" p the inequality holds, but for \large" p it fails (because 2 £ R M (0) ¡ R M (c) ¤ > R(0; c)¸R(0; t) holds for all c).
Equilibrium Selection for ¹ < ¹ (2A)
The¯rst three comparisons are relevant independently of whether (D) holds. (i) relates to the G-equilibrium that lies below ¹ (1A) when (D) holds, and (ii), (iii) relate to G-equilibria that lie above ¹ (1A) when (D) fails. The second three comparisons relate to the area in Figure 5 between the two possible positions of ¹ (1A).
Notation: In the G subgame, we denote¯rm f's expected variable pro¯ts per head by ¼ f (S 1 ; S 2 ; S E ), where f 2 f1; 2; Eg and S f is f's \corporate structure." In the A subgame, the acquirer's expected variable pro¯ts per head are written as ¼ A (S A ; S E ). Expected pro¯ts can be obtained by multiplying by ¹ and subtracting the relevant sunk costs, which depend on the¯rm's S.
(i) The incumbents have (N; ?) Â (1N; 1N; ?) i® R M (c) > R(c; c + t) , x M (c) > c + t, i.e. t su±ciently small; otherwise, they could monopoly price at the G-equilibrium.
(ii) For strictly positive values of the four cost parameters, the incumbents have (a) (R; ?) Â (1N; 1R; ?), and (b) (R; ?) Â (1N; 2R; ?) for all p 2 [0; 1] and ¹ > 0; and (c) (R; ?) Â (1N; 1N; R) wherever (R; ?) is the A-equilibrium because the incumbents make zero pro¯ts in (1N; 1N; R). Because it implies monopolization, acquisition-FDI strictly increases the incumbents' expected variable pro¯ts in all three cases; furthermore, it reduces their combined sunk costs in (b) (as acquisition-FDI is substituted for green¯eld-FDI).
(iii) The incumbents have (R; ?) Â (1R; 1R; ?) i®
The comparison between (R; ?) and (1R; 1R; ?) arises on ¹ 2 (max f¹ (2G) ; ¹ (1A)g ; ¹ (2A)) or, equivalently, I ¹ 2
where all three arguments on the RHS are independent of I (i.e. I enters ¹ (2A), ¹ (2G) and ¹ (1A) multiplicatively). Using the following two results, we conclude that (1) holds for \almost all" I=¹ in (2). Result (a): All I=¹ in (2) satisfy (1) unless (c; t) lies below W and right of X in Figure 6 , and p is \small." 53 If (a) cannot be invoked (i.e. p \small" and (c; t) within W and X in Figure 6 ), then (b) applies when (D) holds. Result (b): If I=¹ (2G) < I=¹ (1A), then some I=¹ in (2) satisfy (1) for all p 2 [0; 1]. 54 Therefore, if p is \large," result (a) applies; if p is \small," the only area in Figure 6 not discussed is (c; t) below W, right of X and within region IV. The comparison between (R; ?) and (1R; 1R; ?) is complicated, despite being monopoly vs. duopoly, because R&D investment is twice as large under (1R; 1R; ?) so for the industry as a whole the probability of R&D success exceeds p.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] and \most" of the area enclosed by W and X is s.t. ® = 0, i.e. t > x M (c)¡c. Note that ®+¯p+°p 2 < 0 within W and X only for \small" p from symmetry of LHS around its turning point: Figure 6 . 55 Therefore, we conclude that, on ¹ 2 (¹ (2A) ; ¹ (6G)), the incumbents have (1R; 1R; ?) Â (R; R) for \almost all" c; t; p.
The next four comparisons use Figure 7 , which plots the G-equilibria for ¹ > ¹ (6G) in (G=¹; I=¹)-space. (The denominators of the inter-regional boundaries in Figure 7 are implicitly de¯ned by the equalities listed at the start of section 6.1. Note that, because I enters ¹ (6G), ¹ (8G) and ¹ (9G) multiplicatively and G enters ¹ (7G) and ¹ (10G) multiplicatively, all the inter-regional boundaries are independent of G; I.) [INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] (ii) For \almost all" I=¹ < I=¹ (6G) a comparison between (R; R) and (1R; 1R; R) arises. 56 The incumbents have (R; R) Â (1R; 1R; R) i® I=¹ > 2¼ 1 (1R; 1R; R) ¡ ¼ A (R; R). It is straightforward to show that the vertical position of I=¹ = 2¼ 1 (1R; 1R; R) ¡ ¼ A (R; R) in Figure 7 is as follows:
For \small" t and \small" p:
For \small" t and \large" p:
For \large" t (and all p):
, and on ¹ 2 (¹ (9G) ; ¹ (10G)) (R; R) is \more likely" to be preferred, the larger is I.
Therefore, for \small" p increases in t can cause the incumbents' preferred equilibrium to switch from (1R; 1R; R) to (R; R) (i.e. increases in t \encourage" acquisition-FDI). However, for \large" p increases in t can have the opposite e®ect, \discouraging" acquisition-FDI. Intuition for this result is provided in the main text.
(iii) For I=¹ 2 (I=¹ (8G) ; I=¹ (6G)) a comparison between (R; R) and (1R; 2R; ?) arises (if G=¹ > G=¹ (7G) , ¹ < ¹ (7G)). This is region II of Figure 3 . The incumbents have (R; R) Â (1R; 2R; ?) i® I=¹ > ¼ 1 (1R; 2R; ?) + ¼ 2 (1R; 2R; ?) ¡ ¼ A (R; R) ¡ G=¹, whose RHS is strictly decreasing in G to re°ect a straightforward \substitution e®ect" towards acquisition-FDI as green¯eld-FDI becomes more costly. Therefore, for \large" G (de¯ned in section 6.1 as the limiting case as G ¡! 1) the incumbents have (R; R) Â (1R; 2R; ?) for all ¹ 2 (¹ (6G) ; min f¹ (7G) ; ¹ (8G)g).
Next we investigate the incumbents' preference ranking for \small" G, de¯ned in section 6.1 as G · I. The incumbents have (1R; 2R; ?)
, which holds for \almost all" c; t; p. 57 Therefore, the equilibrium industrial structure (EIS) in region II of Figure 3 is determined as follows:
\Large" G (1R; 1R; R) (R; R) t; p \small": (1R; 1R; R) otherwise: (R; R)
Whenever the incumbents have (R; R) Â (1R; 1R; R) in region II of Figure 3 (i.e. unless t and p are both \small"), the EIS would always be (R; R) if green¯eld-FDI were ruled out. Therefore, for \small" G, acquisition-FDI is made unpro¯table by the option of green¯eld-FDI, but it would arise if green¯eld-FDI were ruled out.
(iv) A comparison between (R; R) and (2R; 2R; ?) arises (a) on I=¹ 2 (I=¹ (9G) ; I=¹ (8G)), i.e. region III of Figure 3 ; and (b) for G=¹ < G=¹ (7G), on I=¹ > I=¹ (8G), which are compatible under (C) i® p is \large." Comparison (b) refers to ¹ 2 (¹ (7G) ; ¹ (8G)) in Figure  3 . The incumbents have (R; R) Â (2R; 2R; ?) i® I=¹ > 2¼ 1 (2R; 2R; ?) ¡ ¼ A (R; R) ¡ 2G=¹, whose RHS is strictly decreasing in G due to substitution towards acquisition-FDI as green¯eld-FDI becomes more costly. In case (a) the incumbents have (2R; 2R; ?) Â (R; R) for all \small" G i® 2¼ 1 (2R; 2R; ?) ¡ ¼ A (R; R) ¡ 2I=¹ (8G) > I=¹ (8G); for p 6 = 0; 1, this requires 2R(0; c)(3p ¡ 1) > 3R(0; t)p, which holds (resp. fails) for \large" (resp. \small") p. 60 Therefore, the EIS in region III of Figure 3 is determined as follows: 
2 R(0; c) and (1 ¡ p) 2 R(c; c + t) > p 2 (1 ¡ 2p) R(0; t).) Turning to p 2 [0; 0:5), there are two cases to consider. First, if t¸0:5 so ± = 0, then the resulting quadratic has an interior minimum on p 2 [0; 1] (because¯+ 2°> 0). Therefore, the quadratic is strictly positive for all p i® 4®°>¯2, which never holds on t¸0:5. Second, if t < 0:5 so ± < 0, then the cubic has an interior minimum on p 2 [0; 1] at the smaller root of¯+ 2°p + 3±p 2 = 0 because the LHS is larger at p = 1 than 0. Setting LHS = 0 at that p-value generates locus Z in Figure 6 ; below (resp. above) Z, LHS > (resp. <) 0 at its minimum on p 2 [0; 1].
58 If (c; t) lies below V in Figure 6 , then the G-equilibrium will be (1R; 1R; R) rather than (1R; 2R; ?) for some \small" G and some \small" p; see result (i) in section 6.1. To limit taxonomy, we ignore this minor case.
\Small" p \Large" p \Small" t \Large" t \Small" G \Large" G Turning to case (b), 63 the region in Figure 7 enclosed by G=¹ < G=¹ (7G) and I=¹ > I=¹ (8G) is non-empty i® p > 2 [R(0; c) ¡ R(0; t)] = [2R(0; c) ¡ R(0; t)]. Given this, the incumbents have (2R; 2R; ?) Â (R; R) for all permissible (G=¹; I=¹) i® 2R(t; c) > R(0; t), i.e. t \small." If t is \large" (i.e. R(0; t) > 2R(t; c)), then two cases emerge: for \small" permissible p, (R; R) Â (2R; 2R; ?) for all permissible (G=¹; I=¹); for \large" permissible p, (2R; 2R; ?) Â (resp. Á) (R; R) for \small" (resp. \large") permissible (G=¹; I=¹). 64 (v) For ¹ > ¹ (10G) , G=¹ < G=¹ (10G), a comparison arises between (R; R) and (2R; 2R; R). The incumbents have (R; R) Â (2R; 2R; R) i® I=¹ > 2¼ 1 (2R; 2R; R)¡¼ A (R; R)¡ 2G=¹. ¼ A (R; R)¸2¼ 1 (2R; 2R; R) for all p 2 [0:5; 1], so (R; R) Â (2R; 2R; R) for all permissible (G=¹; I=¹) there. For p < 0:5, 2¼ 1 (2R; 2R; R) > ¼ A (R; R), so (2R; 2R; R) Â (R; R) certainly for \small" permissible (G=¹; I=¹). (2R; 2R; R) Â (R; R) for all permissible (G=¹; I=¹) i® 2¼ 1 (2R; 2R; R)¡¼ A (R; R)¡2G=¹ (10G) > fR(0; t)= [R(0; c) ¡ R(t; c)]g [G=¹ (10G)], which holds for su±ciently \small" p i® 2R(t; c) > R(0; t), i.e. t \small." Therefore, for \small" p, we have: (2R; 2R; R) Â (R; R) for all permissible (G=¹; I=¹) if t is \small"; and (2R; 2R; R) Â (resp. Á) (R; R) for \small" (resp. \large") permissible (G=¹; I=¹) if t is \large." Intuition for these results is analogous to that given in footnote 64. 
